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Researching Secret Spaces:  
A Reflexive Account on Negotiating Risk and Academic Integrity* 
 
…what constitutes risk is less about what took place in the field than what takes place on 
the page. How we story the experience. And what we decide to reveal. The risk at this level 
is about what we disclose to readers about ourselves and others, and how what we write 
about may figure into our careers. 
H. L. Goodall Jr.1 
 
Authors [in law] are expected to write up research by mentioning ‘the facts’, the theories, 
and possibly the methods. The relationship between facts, theories, methods, and the 
researcher, however, is rendered invisible, and so is the personal, social, and political 
character of research. 
S. Nouwen2 
1. Introduction 
In the midst of Syria’s social collapse, legal innovation has flourished in a range of public and 
private registers. The high degree of risk involved in working in such a complex geopolitical 
context has presented particular challenges for prominent public bodies, thus opening up 
greater space for a variety of smaller, often non-state actors, to undertake a range of emergency 
relief, advocacy, and criminal investigation practices.3 Some of these actors working on highly 
sensitive issues are able to operate ‘under the radar’4 and require a high degree of secrecy for 
their continuing success. This article considers the case of one such actor, the Commission for 
International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) as a way to reflect on the nature of legal 
research and the production of knowledge in relation to secretive organisations.   
                                                          
* Many thanks to all of my interviewees at CIJA, the engaging reviewers of this Journal, the wonderful research 
assistance of Anan AbuShanab, Sascha Kouvelis and Mariana Matias and the generous feedback of Sarath Burgis-
Kasthala, Hilary Charlesworth, Fleur Johns, Toby Kelly, Andrew Lang, Sarah Nouwen, Anthea Roberts, Rebecca 
Sutton, Sally Wheeler and especially, Pat O’Malley. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Sociology seminar series, Australian National University in May 2018 and I acknowledge the rich responses I 
received there. This research was funded by the Australian Research Council.  
1 Quoted in K. A. Stewart et al., ‘Risky Research: Investigating the “Perils” of Ethnography’, in N. K. Denzin 
and D. Giardina (eds.), Qualitative Inquiry and Social Justice: Toward a Politics of Hope (2009), at 213. 
2 S. M. H. Nouwen,‘“As You Set out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions 
about Socio-Legal Research in Conflict’, (2014) 27 LJIL 227, at 233. 
3 For a general overview, see B. Van Schaack, Imagining Justice for Syria: Water Always Finds its Way (2020), 
(forthcoming).  
4 Interview #2, (16 June 2017) at CIJA headquarters.  
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CIJA’s risky and secretive work presents particular challenges for the scholar seeking 
to produce ‘rigorous’ research for a legal audience. The integrity of legal scholars tends to rest 
on our ability to demonstrate a compelling command of the field, especially through 
sophisticated engagement with doctrine as well as theory. Yet in the case of researching CIJA, 
these resources were not available to me. Secrecy required that I could not engage with any of 
CIJA’s pre-trial briefs, or legal ‘product’ (as doctrine), and the theory of entrepreneurial justice 
I developed to explain its role in the wider accountability field only emerged much later in the 
process of my own reflection. In setting up this research, a host of logistical questions soon 
arose and given my interest in international criminal justice responses in the midst of the Arab 
uprisings, I quickly developed an interest in CIJA upon reading some newspaper accounts of 
their work in Syria. Beyond these stories though, I soon learnt that there was nothing else to go 
on. Given the lack of data publicly available on CIJA then, how could I, an international legal 
academic, go about researching this organisation? Could anything of scholarly value emerge 
from such a dearth of data?5 Was this type of research just too risky for me as a researcher, but 
more importantly, to those working in the ‘high threat environment’ of the Syrian 
accountability field?6 Such ruminations quickly opened up a broader set of reflections on the 
methodologies I would need in approaching CIJA as a secretive organisation and as linked to 
academic anxieties over my own integrity. Accordingly, this article does not offer a detailed 
account about my substantive findings on the nature of CIJA’s work. Instead, the article serves 
as a way for us to reflect on the process of scholarly outputs as well as on our own positionality 
as scholars, lawyers, and activists.   
                                                          
5 This challenge is also dealt with by Nouwen, supra note 2, at 238. For a rejection of the idea of ‘data’ in its 
entirety, see N. K. Denzin,‘The Death of Data?’, (2013) 13 Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 353; and 
E. A. St. Pierre, ‘Writing Post Qualitative Inquiry’, (2018) 24 Qualitative Inquiry 603, at 605-606. 
6 According to CIJA’s technology security coordinator and ‘ethical hacker’, training workshop, 2 November 2018. 
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 CIJA is hard to categorise. It is registered as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
in the Netherlands and has its headquarters in another European capital. Headquarters staff hail 
overwhelmingly from Western states and many have extensive international criminal law 
experience. The largest number of dedicated staff working on the Syria files, however, are 
Syrians themselves and are based in Syria and neighbouring states where they seek to obtain 
documentation and witness statements that inform both future international trials and already 
have been used in domestic trials across Europe. As an organisation that concentrates on 
securing and analysing evidence that implicates those at the very top of the Assad regime as 
well as ISIS, CIJA’s highly sensitive work can only succeed beyond the purview of popular 
and scholarly scrutiny. While it is an international NGO, its lack of a public profile — it has 
no website and tends to avoid public scrutiny — points to its divergence with the advocacy 
work of standard human rights organisations. Although secrecy structures all of CIJA’s extra-
organisational interactions, a degree of public recognition and legitimacy is crucial in 
sustaining its funding (from public donors) and its position within the field of international 
criminal justice. Part of this legitimacy can derive from academic validity that scholars such as 
myself can supply. Researching CIJA then rests on a delicate negotiation where the scholar can 
gain knowledge about the organisation in a highly constrained manner, which if disseminated 
discretely and with adequate detachment, can produce a degree of legitimation for CIJA on the 
one hand, and the preservation of academic integrity on the other.   
Yet risk operates here at a number of levels. Most simply, ‘[r]isk often begins with the 
choice of research site’.7 Once I had identified CIJA for my scholarly inquiry, I was confronted 
by the far more palpable risks experienced by CIJA’s staff in carrying out their work in and on 
conflict zones. In walking a fine line between ensuring CIJA discretion and satisfying scholarly 
conventions, there was the constant risk of foreclosing my CIJA access as well as putting my 
                                                          
7 Stewart et al., supra note 1, at 200.  
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scholarly reputation at risk.8 Through the CIJA case, here I ask, where do the risks lie and how 
could and should I as a scholar manage this responsibility?   
For my own study, I had to turn to interviewing as my sole source of data. This is 
unusual within the discipline of law and even in the adjunct fields of legal anthropology and 
socio-legal studies where ethnographically informed methods based on interviews and 
participant observation are often read together with a range of legal texts. As lawyers, it is hard 
to abandon our faith in these traditional textual forms and CIJA’s dearth of documentary data 
is in stark contrast with the voluminous material already generated by (public) international 
criminal tribunals.9 As these interviews were usually conversations occurring between experts 
in international law — myself as scholar, and my interlocutor as legal practitioner -we can 
think of ‘my findings’ as paraethnographic, or in the words of George Marcus, collaborations 
among researchers and, ‘other sorts of experts with shared, discovered, and negotiated critical 
sensibilities’.10 Studying the worldviews of fellow lawyers operating in highly globalised, 
secret spaces enables us to explore the ways in which meanings are made, not only through 
their quotidian work practices, but also through the process of (para)ethnographic inquiry itself. 
Accordingly, this article provides an ethnographic account about the process of research itself. 
It seeks to enrich international legal methodological reflection through a conversation with 
some relevant anthropological debates.11  
                                                          
8 A. Riles, ‘Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies’, in D. Cowan and D. Wincott (eds.), Exploring the 
‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies (2016), at 260.   
9 In Nouwen’s reflection on her own socio-legal journey in the field of international criminal justice, she raises a 
related contrast between the growth of scholarship on (or for) the field compared to scant empirical work such as 
hers. See Nouwen, supra note 2, at 228-229.  
10 G. E. Marcus, ‘Introduction’, in G. E. Marcus (ed.), Para-Sites: A Casebook Against Cynical Reason (2000), at 
3.  
11 Anthropology comprises a number of branches. I refer to ‘anthropology’ as only the social/cultural branch of 
the discipline.  
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This article begins in section two by discussing my (substantive) findings on CIJA through 
a concept which I call ‘entrepreneurial justice’.12 I define ‘entrepreneurial justice’ as the 
identification of a gap or weakness in existing public accountability fora and the creation of a 
new private or privatised organization and/or approach that seeks to address (at least part of) 
this gap. As exemplary of this trend, studying CIJA’s inner workings is a way of understanding 
the role of (innovative) international criminal law (ICL) frameworks in the governance of 
societies in collapse. The article’s central focus emerges in section three, which considers 
questions of access, secrecy and scholarly knowledge production by engaging with a variety of 
anthropological debates. Finally, in section four, I consider the ethics of such research in 
relation to the Syrian civil war. In interviewing CIJA’s Syrian lawyers risking their lives on a 
daily basis, I ask whether it is possible or desirable to reconcile the, ‘complex and sometimes 
contradictory roles as scholars and as activists in the chaotic, multilayered world of’ 
(post)conflict justice.13 Rather than conclude with an unassailable and general prescription, 
instead, I invite my audience to continue these conversations as enriched through their own 
reflexive research experiences.   
2. Foreground as background: CIJA as an exemplar of entrepreneurial justice 
The nature of CIJA as an organisation and its work easily lends itself to media-generated 
narratives about ‘Syria’s truth smugglers’.14 Yet, it is also important that as scholars we can 
step back and interrogate our own responsibility to our research subjects and our scholarly 
audience(s).15 For Madison, ‘fieldwork data travel to the public stage with the hope that the 
                                                          
12 I develop this concept in detail in: M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Entrepreneurial Justice: Syria, the Commission for 
International Justice and Accountability and the Renewal of International Criminal Justice’ European Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming).  
13 S. E. Merry, ‘Anthropology and International Law’, (2006) 35 Annual Review of Anthropology 99, at 107. Also 
see D. Mosse, ‘Misunderstood, misrepresented, contested? Anthropological knowledge production in question’, 
(2015) 72 Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 128, at 131.  
14 J. Borger, ‘Syria’s truth smugglers’, Guardian, 13 May 2015.  
15 C. Smissaert & K. Jalonen, ‘Responsibility in Academic Writing: A Dialogue of the Dead’, (2017) 24 
Qualitative Inquiry 704. 
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performance will invoke a response (ability) among a group or spectators’.16 Here in this 
section, I present my findings about CIJA, which emerged from my fieldwork. Although this 
story is the ‘substantive’ scholarly contribution arising from my research, I want to show that 
such an account makes sense only when situated within its methodological ‘backstory’. Thus, 
my brief account of ‘entrepreneurial justice’ here acts not as the foreground, but as the 
background to this article, allowing us to explore how I came to its conceptualisation in sections 
three and four.  
From modest beginnings in the early days of the Syrian uprising, CIJA has evolved to 
become a sophisticated organisation working in a range of (post)conflict sites including the 
Balkans, Burma, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Nigeria and Syria. Once it became clear 
that events on the ground in Syria were degenerating in 2011, a range of local and international 
governmental and non-governmental actors started organising themselves along a spectrum of 
humanitarian governance.17 The future director of CIJA, Dr. William Wiley was an 
experienced ‘legal humanitarian’ himself,18 having worked in Canada’s domestic war crimes 
programme, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a field investigator, before 
moving to the Iraqi High Tribunal. Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office approached 
Wiley in 2011 and asked if he could coordinate some human rights training for Syrian lawyers. 
Wiley rejected the human rights portfolio and instead offered to provide services specifically 
in training local activists and lawyers to collect evidence for future (international) criminal 
trials. At the time, no one else was doing this in Syria and Wiley wanted to develop the capacity 
                                                          
16 D. S. Madison, ‘Dangerous Ethnography’ in N. K. Denzin and D. Giardina (eds.), Qualitative Inquiry and 
Social Justice: Toward a Politics of Hope (2009), at 193.  
17 This is a term used by Barnett, but in his account, international criminal accountability actors are not included. 
See M. Barnett, ‘Humanitarian Governance’, (2013) 16 Annual Review of Political Science 379. 
18 On the notion of ‘legal humanitarianism’, see S. Kendall, ‘Beyond the Restorative Turn: The Limits of Legal 
Humanitarianism’, in C. De Vos et al. (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International 
Criminal Court Intervention (2015). 
Page 7 of 31 
 
to secure evidence outside the country and build up a cadre of skilled Syrians able to collect 
robust witness statements as well as documentation now amounting to around 800,000 pages. 
CIJA’s successes in training and evidence collection soon won the support of a number of 
European government donors, who, since 2013, have provided it with a healthy budget of 
around 7 million Euros for its operations in Syria and beyond.  
Accounts emerging from my interviews with CIJA employees were replete with highly 
thoughtful and expert reflections gained from experience within public ICL sites. While 
typically convinced of a world improved (and improvable) through ICL, CIJA’s Western-
trained staff were all highly sceptical of current — public — institutional arrangements.19 Yet 
CIJA staff do not see their work as replacing public bodies, but rather, as filling in gaps in 
public capacities, as best illustrated through CIJA’s assistance with a range of domestic 
criminal trials.20 Along with its various contributions to domestic cases, CIJA’s ‘secondary’ 
work includes capacity building of local lawyers as well as information sharing with a variety 
of states conducting anti-terrorist and law-enforcement initiatives. All these ventures implicate 
traditional public forms of power but are often carried out beyond public scrutiny and 
knowledge in hidden spaces. If we combine these elements of CIJA’s work along with the way 
it actively markets its unique contribution to its donors across a range of security, development, 
and accountability gaps, then ‘entrepreneurial justice’ speaks to its contribution in Syria and 
beyond.  
                                                          
19 The most noteworthy being the ongoing inability of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to act in relation to 
Syria due the absence of Syrian ICC membership and the double veto of Russia and China against ICC jurisdiction 
through the United Nations (UN) Security Council. See UN Security Council Draft Resolution, UN Doc. 
S/2014/348 (22 May 2014). 
20 For example, there is now collaborative work between CIJA and the United Nations’ International, Impartial, 
Independent Mechanism (IIIM), which was established in December 2016, as per the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 71/248 on International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, UN Doc. A/RES/71/248 (21 December 2016). The two organisations 
entered into a memorandum of understanding on the 28th June 2019, whose provisions facilitate the transfer of 
CIJA’s files to the IIM, particularly in the latter’s pursuit of domestic, criminal trials.  
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How was I able to identify the nature of CIJA’s work as a form of entrepreneurial 
justice? What scholarly risks were involved in relying so greatly on the account of my 
interviewees? Particularly in engaging with CIJA’s Syrian staff, how could I ensure that my 
own research did not increase the risks they faced on a daily basis? Could I tell enough of a 
story to satisfy a ‘scholarly audience’ without compromising the safety of my informants? 
These were questions I confronted while conducting my research as well as while trying to 
write up my findings and they inform the following two sections.  
 
3. Background as foreground: taking methodology seriously  
 
3.1 Negotiating access and secrecy 
 
Depictions of the Commission’s work have appeared in highly readable, dramatic, and 
prominent media sources, including by The Guardian,21 the Washington Post,22 The 
Economist,23 a UK Channel 4 TV documentary24 along with the New Yorker’s detailed 
portrayal in Taub’s ‘Assad Files’ 2016 story.25 These stories were the result of journalists 
approaching CIJA seeking information on their work. Over time CIJA’s profile has grown in 
the media world and typically a widely read article precipitates a raft of further journalistic 
requests for meetings and interviews, particularly through Nerma Jelacic, one of CIJA’s 
Directors and a former Fleet Street journalist and then head of communications at the ICTY. 
For the legal researcher, these stories are frustrating to read: they open up a fascinating topic 
                                                          
21 J. Borger, ‘Smuggled Syrian documents enough to indict Bashar al-Assad, say investigators’, Guardian, 13 
May 2015; Borger, supra note 14; J. Borger ‘The Guardian view on international law: we need enforcement and 
example’, Guardian, 15 October 2016; J. Borger, ‘The Guardian view on Syria, the ceasefire and the aid convoy 
attack: a new low’, Guardian, 21 September 2016; J. Borger ‘The Guardian view on Syrian war crimes: searching 
for a road to justice’, Guardian, 8 February 2017; and  R. Engel and K. Werner, ‘Investigators quietly probe 
allegations of Syrian war crimes’, NBC News, 30 March 2018.  
22 M. Kersten, ‘Here’s How Perpetrators of Crimes in Syria are being Prosecuted’, Washington Post, 4 March 
2019. 
23 ‘The Documents Men: Will smuggled files lead to justice for the Assad regime’s victims?’, Economist, 24 
November 2018.  
24 Four Corners, ‘Syria’s Disappeared’, (2018) UK Channel 4. 
25 B. Taub, ‘The Assad Files’, New Yorker, 16 April 2016.  
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of inquiry on the nature of private actor accountability mechanisms for Syria, but ultimately 
they are superficial – if not sensationalised - accounts. While such accounts do provide some 
details about CIJA’s work along with the identities of some of its leadership-level staff, beyond 
this, the exact parameters of CIJA’s funding, location or network of personnel, remain elusive. 
They also cannot replace standard scholarly sources, and so in trying to design my own research 
project with sufficient ‘legitimacy’, it soon became evident that I would need to move beyond 
the realm of journalistic fascination.  
After gaining a cursory sense in 2015 about the Commission through these media 
sources, I started to seek more ‘official’ resources,26 such as CIJA’s website, along with any 
extant scholarly or grey literature on the Commission. My searches produced nothing. I was 
not surprised by the lack of scholarly or policy reporting given the time frame of less than three 
years since CIJA’s inception. The absence, however, of any ‘official’ presence of the 
Commission in the form of a website was puzzling. I resorted to basic Google searches based 
on the names provided in the media stories. From this, it was clear that CIJA’s Director, 
William Wiley, was comfortable in being identified. Searching his name led to a handful of 
references to talks he had given about CIJA and amidst this material, was sufficient information 
to contact him directly. 
Like Taub, I was granted access to CIJA through a series of email exchanges, then 
Skype interviews, and then two visits. The first to its European headquarters in 2017 and then 
to a training workshop in the Middle East for its Syrian lawyers in 2018. I agreed to exclude 
key identifying facts from any published material, which would also be shared with CIJA staff 
before submission. I was happy to oblige. Yet, unlike a journalist, I was far more interested in 
the nature of the legal work itself and was unsure how far I could delve into these details. While 
                                                          
26 Nouwen too notes the complex relationship between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ stories. See Nouwen, supra note 
2, at 234.  
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perhaps sharing a degree of disciplinary affinity with many of my interlocutors as fellow 
lawyers, the secrets of CIJA’s impressive archive and its now-extensive legal briefs remain out 
of my reach. It was clear from early email exchanges that I would need to frame my research 
questions in a manner that enabled CIJA to operate discreetly.27 Was there anything of 
scholarly value though that could emerge from such a constrained inquiry? What sorts of 
questions could I ask? Was there any way to verify – or triangulate - the material once I had 
gathered it? Should I be concerned with such questions of research ‘rigour’ at all, or was there 
some other story to be told about my (ongoing) encounter with this organisation? 
Perhaps now, four years after initially approaching CIJA, some of these concerns are 
less vexing. Today there are citable scholarly sources on CIJA,28 far more newspaper and 
policy reports mentioning the Commission, and even an ad hoc internship program offered 
through Harvard Law School.29 Its key spokespeople, Executive Director, William Wiley30; 
Director (Operations and Investigations), Chris Engels31; Director (Management and External 
Relations), Nerma Jelacic as well as the Chair of the Board of Commissioners, Steve Rapp32, 
continue to sustain a public profile for CIJA’s work. Such material post facto allows me a 
degree of triangulation33 with my extant data from participant observation and over thirty 
interviews. Yet in contrast to much of this material with its remit of overviewing (time and 
                                                          
27 My interview questions are listed at the end of this article. 
28 I. Elliott, ‘‘A Meaningful Step towards Accountability’?: A View from the Field on the United Nations 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria’, (2017) 15Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 239; M. Rankin, ‘Investigating Crimes against Humanity in Syria and Iraq: The Commission for 
International Justice and Accountability’, (2017) 9 Global Responsibility to Protect 395; and M. Rankin, ‘The 
Future of International Criminal Evidence in New Wars? The Evolution of the Commission for International 
Justice and Accountability (CIJA)’, (2018) 20 Journal of Genocide Research 392. 
29 This internship was coordinated by Professor Alex Whiting, a faculty member, Commissioner of CIJA and one 
of my (publicly-quotable) interviewees.   
30 See, for example, a panel discussion which included William Wiley hosted by the International Bar Association 
on 13 April 2019 in The Hague: https://vimeo.com/332691433 (last accessed 12 July 2019).  
31 See, for example, an interview with Chris Engels in September 2018, see https://www.csce.gov/international-
impact/interview-chris-engels-director-investigations-and-operations-commission (last accessed 12 July 2019).  
32 See, for example, an interview with Stephen Rapp in https://harvardmagazine.com/2018/03/justice-seeker (last 
accessed 12 July 2019).  
33 See Nouwen, supra note 2, at 240. 
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again) the basic characteristics of the Commission, my own encounters provided a chance to 
reflect substantively on the nature of the production of legal knowledge and academic ‘rigour’. 
In the absence of other scholarly sources at the time of researching, the process forced me to 
think about what counts as ‘legally rigorous research’ and how this might be different to rigour 
in its more traditional social science sense.34  
The field of law sits uneasily in relation to a number of disciplinary trends. While socio-
legal research is closely linked with standard social science approaches to the generation of 
‘data’, poststructuralist trends within law, such as those advanced by certain feminist and other 
critical scholars, are far closer to interpretivist sensibilities that have come to inform the 
reflective turn in anthropology which I discuss in the next section. Bochner rejects the 
possibility of reconciliation between social scientists and interpretivists, pointing out that:  
Researchers who seek more accurate predictions do not speak the same language as 
those who want to understand how different people make sense of the world and how 
to cope more effectively with contingencies of lived experience. Neither vocabulary is 
the one and only suitable vocabulary for studying and/or understanding human life.35 
 
Within the realm of qualitative inquiry, the constant refrain of rigour can soon turn to ‘rigor-
mortis’.36 While largely convinced of thinking beyond rigour, as a lawyer bereft of legal texts 
to work with in this case, establishing a claim to academic authority along with sustaining my 
scholarly integrity has been particularly challenging.  
                                                          
34 For example, see Geertz’s discussion on ‘convergent data’ in anthropology, which he defines as, ‘descriptions, 
measures, observations, what you will, which are at once diverse, even rather miscellaneous, both as to type and 
degree of precision and generality, unstandardized facts, opportunistically collected and variously portrayed, 
which yet turn out to shed light on one another for the simple reason that the individuals they are descriptions, 
measures, or observations of are directly involved in one another's lives; people, who in a marvellous phrase of 
Alfred Schutz's, "grow old together." As such they differ from the sort of data one gets from polls, or surveys, or 
censuses, which yield facts about classes of individuals not otherwise related’. See C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: 
Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983), at 156.  
35 A. P. Bochner, ‘Unfurling Rigor: On Continuity and Change in Qualitative Inquiry’, (2018) 24 Qualitative 
Inquiry 359, at 363. 
36 Ibid, at 364.  
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  Recounting my (limited) story of access is important in appreciating my relationship 
with my site of study. The rich world of meaning making that came to emerge from my 
interviews opened up a series of perspectives not only on the substantive topic, entrepreneurial 
justice, but also, on the nature of legal knowledge and authority. Making methodological sense 
of this material through anthropological contributions has further underscored the contingency 
not only of my own approach, but of scholarly knowledge more generally. It is important to 
note these limitations and to sit with them rather than try to resolve them. Massoud advocates 
this type of ‘accounting’ in his survey of scholarship on conflict zones, suggesting that in, 
‘addition to what fieldwork reveals, consider what it has not revealed, what has been said and 
not said, what has been resisted, and what was unexpected’.37 It is also important to 
acknowledge how this knowledge as present or absent was solely at the discretion of CIJA 
staff. For example, on arriving at the training workshop in late 2018, I was advised that I would 
not be allowed to attend all of the sessions due to their sensitive nature. When this was later 
revised and I was allowed to attend all of the main sessions, this created a sense of particular 
privilege, risk as well as responsibility. When placed in such ‘hyphen-spaces’ of research, 
Cunliffe and Karunanayake remind us that:  
[w]hen researchers…spend any time in a research site, they find themselves 
deliberately and/or unconsciously reacting to respondents’ actions and comments as 
they negotiate expectations about this relationship, try to gain access to the site and the 
people, determine what data can be collected and how, which voices will be heard in 
the research account, and what happens after that study. These issues, crucial to the 
success of research, are often ignored in research accounts and descriptions of 
methodology, and yet data collection is a human activity in which relationships emerge 
that may influence research in significant ways…38  
 
                                                          
37 M. F. Massoud, ‘Field Research on Law in Conflict Zones and Authoritarian States’, (2016) 12 Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 85, at 89.  
38 A. L. Cunliffe and G. Karunanayake, ‘Working within Hyphen-Spaces in Ethnographic Research: Implications 
for Research Identities and Practice’, (2013) 16 Organizational Research Methodology 364, at 365.  
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While recognising the constrained access CIJA has provided to me, this was still a rare 
opportunity and one that carries with it an ethical responsibility, especially for my Syrian 
interlocutors as explored in section four.39 
I have also come to reappraise the nature of data itself. Rather than seeing more 
information as more data, and hence more rigorous,40 we can also see the absence of 
information as itself a form of data.41 In my case, I could gain a sense of how CIJA wants to 
present itself to me and to the wider public by noting what was revealed and what remained 
hidden.42 Through the gradual building of rapport,43 I was and am permitted to tread a 
circumscribed path that permits a degree of access in exchange for my continuing discretion.44 
A mutually beneficial relationship evolves here where I can assemble material for publication, 
which can also provide a degree of academic legitimacy for CIJA’s work.  
The practical result of limited access to a secretive organisation is the need to be ever-
adaptive in one’s research methods, which may result in, ‘novel approaches to writing 
                                                          
39 Similarly, for Nouwen, the, ‘unequal access to opportunities taints the production of knowledge – only a 
particular set of people, in a particular set of circumstances, is able to shape the research agenda which in turn 
informs polices that shape the world. These limitations on knowledge production are exacerbated by the 
discipline’s own assessment of who counts as ‘authority’’. See Nouwen, supra note 2, at 258. On the responsibility 
of access, see also A. Al-Hardan, ‘Decolonizing Research on Palestinians: Towards Critical Epistemologies and 
Research Practice’, (2014) 20 Qualitative Inquiry 61; and A. Cerwonka, ‘Nervous Conditions’, in A. Cerwonka 
& L. Malkii, Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic Fieldwork (2007), at 34.  
40 Ibid, at 10.   
41 Many thanks for Katherine Carroll for this insight. Also note Denzin’s point here, who suggests that, ‘the politics 
and political economy of…data…is not a question of evidence or no evidence. It is rather a question of who has 
the power to control the definition of evidence, who defines the kinds of materials that count as evidence, who 
determines what methods best produce the best forms of evidence, whose criteria and standards are used to 
evaluate quality evidence’ See Denzin, supra note 5, at 354. 
42 For an example, see V. Smith, ‘Ethnographies of Work and the Work of Ethnographers’, in P Atkinson et al. 
(eds.), Handbook of Ethnography (2011). 
43 On the importance of rapport in gaining access, see Y. Morse, ‘Elite interviews in the developing world: finding 
anchors in weak institutional environments’, (2019) 19 Qualitative Research 277, at 280-282. See also T. J. 
Watson, ‘Ethnography, Reality, and Truth: The Vital Need for Studies of ‘How Things Work’ in Organizations 
and Management’, (2011) 48 Journal of Management Studies 202, at 212; and E. M. Bruch, ‘Researching Human 
Rights Professionals: Tracing the Networks of Human Rights Practice’, (2019) 11 Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 116, at 120. Notwithstanding Marcus’s seminal questioning of, ‘the desirability and achievability of 
rapport’ for anthropologists. See G. E. Marcus, ‘The Uses of Complicity in the Changing Mise-en-Scène of 
Anthropological Fieldwork’, (1997) 59 Representations 85, at 86.  
44 G. M. Jones, ‘Secrecy’, (2014) Annual Review of Anthropology 43, at 54 and 62.  
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ethnography’.45 Thus, in her reflections on researching the security sector, Leander recognises 
that in, ‘many situations, it may be difficult to find the kind of data and answer the kinds of 
questions envisaged by conventional methods instructions and theories’.46 Yet, rather than 
abandon the project, she argues that, ‘flexibility is the only way of avoiding the scholastic 
hubris entailed in assuming that it is possible to know what data is most useful for 
understanding a context and what questions should be asked of it before that context has been 
studied’.47  
Negotiating the risks of secrecy was thus a central concern for me in accessing CIJA 
personnel and trying to build a credible, scholarly account. It was only after 18 months of 
relationship-building that I was permitted to attend the annual training workshop between 
headquarter and Syrian field staff in late 2018. This three-day event was structured by secrecy 
in numerous ways. In our opening session, which included a customary welcome and 
introduction to new staff, participants were asked not to divulge their last names to anyone in 
the room. Highly personal reflections and experiences in this quasi-anonymised register would 
come to play out over the course of the workshop, highlighting how secrecy is a constitutive, 
social practice.48  Thus, Rappert suggests that instead of seeking to, ‘crack the status of the 
                                                          
45 Ibid, at 62. For Gusterson this can lead to ‘polymorphous engagement’, which entails, ‘interacting with 
informants across a number of dispersed sites, not just in local communities, and sometimes in virtual form; and 
it means collecting data eclectically from a disparate array of sources and in many different ways’. H. Gusterson, 
‘Studying Up Revisited’, (1997) 20(1) PoLAR 114, at 116.  
46 A. Leander, ‘Ethnographic Contributions to Method Development: “Strong Objectivity” in Security Studies’, 
(2016) 17(4) International Studies Perspectives 462, at 466.  
47 Ibid, at 467; See also K. E. Carroll and J. Mesman, ‘Ethnographic context meets ethnographic biography: A 
challenge for the mores of doing fieldwork’, (2011) 5 International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches 155, 
at 165; and see Cerwonka, supra note 39, at 23-5.  
48 B. Rappert, ‘Revealing and concealing secrets in research: the potential for the absent’, (2010) 10(5) Qualitative 
Research, at 572. A similar point is made by Salwa Ismail in relation to research conversations she had in Syria, 
which were structured, ‘within implicit understandings of the boundaries of authorise speech.’ This was 
particularly the case when talking about the Hama Uprising of 1982, ‘a subject of silence more than of speech.’ I 
had very similar experiences myself while living in Syria in 2008-2009. See S. Ismail, The Rule of Violence: 
Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria (2018), at 26.  
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hidden…[instead, we should] attend to how the circulation of secrets helps constitute 
understanding’.49  
Later in a Q & A session between Syrian staff and the directors, frustration with secrecy 
was palpable. While Chris Engels assured the Syrian fieldworkers that later the world would 
be able to hear of CIJA’s efforts, it was imperative to sustain secrecy for now. Such a promise 
of delayed publicity was hard to accept for some of CIJA’s Syrian staff whose witness 
testimony work relies on the good will and trust of fellow Syrians who desperately want to see 
speedy results in divulging secrets about their own abuse. Here we can see secrecy as 
productive of a variety of group solidarities based on the, ‘exclusion of outsiders and the 
inclusion of insiders’50.  
Attending the training workshop was instructive in allowing me to question earlier 
assumptions I had had about the value of face-to-face dialogue and interaction. I had conducted 
three Skype interviews the previous year with some of CIJA’s Syrian staff with the assistance 
of CIJA’s Moroccan liaison officer, who stepped in whenever my Arabic failed me. While it 
was clear that I was far from fluent throughout our conversation, my ability to inflect my 
faltering speech with Syrian colloquialisms, picked up while studying Arabic there years 
before, instantly opened up a degree of trust with my interlocutors. Two of these interlocutors 
also attended the workshop. While we greeted each other and maintained a friendly disposition 
throughout the sessions and meals together, the intimate reflection made possible through the 
distancing effect of technology now felt too confronting and uncomfortable. On saying my 
goodbyes to these two former interviewees, I came to realise that the level of secrecy preserved 
                                                          
49 Ibid, at 582.  
50 See Jones, supra note 44, at 54. For a fascinating illustration of research on secret matters, see R J González, 
‘Anthropology and the covert’, (2012) 28(2) Anthropology Today 21; and A. Robben, ‘The Politics of Truth and 
Emotion Among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence’, in C. Nordstrom and A. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork under 
Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival (1995).  
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through disembodied technologies is also productive of intimacy.51 I left the workshop with 
greater confidence in the research I had carried out earlier that was not the result of classic 
ethnographic participant observation.52 Rather than feel assured by the solidity of an 
identifiable field site, I realised that the ‘field’ of my research was a messy, emergent series of 
fragmented experiences in which I am implicated. 
3.2 Reflections on the nature of ‘field’, ‘subject’, and ‘scholarly 
knowledge’: anthropological contributions 
 
While international law scholarship is now more comfortable with interdisciplinary dialogue 
including from some key figures straddling the fields of international law and anthropology,53 
reading beyond these key figures provided me with some intellectual scaffolding on which to 
make sense of my forays into the CIJA ‘field’. Over the last few decades, anthropology’s 
reflective turn has precipitated a questioning of prevailing accounts about the nature of the 
‘field’, ‘subject’, ‘researcher positionality’ as well as ‘ethnographic authority’ and the 
‘(im)possibility of objectivity’. While I cannot do justice to this rich set of debates here, 
acquainting an international law readership with some of these insights is instructive for how 
to think about our own (legal) knowledge claims. Thus, here in this section, I first offer a 
schematic introduction to the field of anthropology before returning to my site of CIJA through 
the lens of scholarly debates about ‘fieldwork’, ethnographic relationships, and 
                                                          
51 For some other reflections on how technology generates both access and intimacy, see Bruch, supra note 43, at 
127. Also see M. W. Sedgwick, ‘Complicit Positioning: Anthropological Knowledge and Problems of “Studying 
Up” for Ethnographer-Employees of Corporations’, (2017) 6 Journal of Business Anthropology 58, at 65.  
52 While Feldman in his account of non-local ethnography downplays the centrality of a field site, he argues that 
participant observation is still required to distinguish ethnography from other endeavours. G. Feldman, 
‘Illuminating the Apparatus: Steps toward a Nonlocal Ethnography of Global Governance’, in C. Shore et al 
(eds.), Policy Worlds: Anthropology and Analysis of Contemporary Power (2011), at 45.  
53 See the work of Kamari Clarke, Sally Merry and Annelise Riles in K. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The 
International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009); S. E. Merry, 
Human Rights and Gender Justice (2006); S. E. Merry (2006), supra note 13; S. E. Merry, ‘The potential of 
ethnographic methods for human rights research’, in B. A. Andreassen et al (eds.), Research Methods in Human 
Rights: A Handbook (2017), 141-158; A. Riles, ‘Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in 
the Iron Cage’, (2006) 108 American Anthropologist 52; A.  Riles, ‘Afterword: A Method More Than a Subject’, 
in D. Cowan & D. Wincott (eds.), Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies (2016), at 257-264.  
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paraethnography. Echoing Twining and his evaluation of the relationship between law and 
anthropology, I want to show that, ‘interdisciplinary collaboration should be viewed as a means 
to an end, not as an end in itself’.54 Rather than try to create a ‘centaur discipline’ of law and 
anthropology,55 instead we can attempt, ‘an hermeneutic tacking between two fields, looking 
first one way, then the other, in order to formulate moral, political, and intellectual issues that 
inform them both’.56 
While employed across a range of disciplines with widely divergent iterations,57 
ethnography is first and foremost associated with anthropology. Darian-Smith characterises 
ethnography not only as a scholarly methodology, but as a perspective and a type of writing.58 
Consequently, it is particularly concerned with the researcher seeing social action as a form of 
meaning-making.59 Classically this took the form of the single (white, male) scholar 
‘displacing’ himself from his own cultural context to immerse himself in another, only to return 
at a remove from the field site to write up his (objective) observations.60 While this cliché no 
longer holds, the idea of ‘displacement’ is still valuable and can be understood as, ‘any inquiry 
that problematizes what the researcher would otherwise take for granted…[it] need not be 
                                                          
54 W. Twining, ‘Law and Anthropology: A Case Study of Inter-Disciplinary Collaboration’, (1973) 7(4) Law & 
Society Review 561, at 562.  
55 See Geertz, supra note 34, at 169. 
56 Ibid, at 170. In addition, Riles suggests that, ‘it is necessary to treat the intersections and gaps between 
disciplines as its own ethnographic zone, to observe how particular actors make claims for themselves and their 
disciplines through and against disciplinary accounts and the borrowing of one another’s methods’. See Riles, 
supra note 53, at 53. 
57 For Sedgwick, ‘the state of ethnography is such that in its proliferation across the academy, and in claims to its 
use everywhere, there is by now no general consensus as to what ethnography is...it rests, precariously, on negative 
definitions, i.e., of what ethnography is not. In practice, ethnography has become an increasingly large receptacle 
for all sorts of qualitative methods’. See Sedgwick, supra note 51, at 74.   
58 E. Darian-Smith, ‘Ethnographies of Law’, in A. Sarat (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society 
(2008), at 549.  
59 F. Johns, Non-legality in International Law (2013), at 21-22; and S E Merry, supra note 13, at 106.   
60 Generally, see Gupta and Ferguson challenging this ideal in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice: 
“The Field” as Site, Method, and Location in Anthropology’, in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds.), Anthropological 
locations: boundaries and grounds of a field science (2007). For a background story to gatekeeping in the 
anthropology discipline, see M. Lamont, How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment 
(2009), at 87-95.  
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reduced to matters of physical location.’61 Yet ethnography entails more than the act of 
(usually, physical) dislocation through practices such as fieldwork. Instead, for Ingold, it is 
about the reflective and documentary process that occurs afterwards. Thus, ‘to cast encounters 
as ethnographic is to consign the incipient – the about-to-happen in unfolding relationships – 
to the temporal past of the already over’.62  
Although reflexivity within anthropology tends to be linked to the ‘crisis of 
representation’ in the 1980s,63 one of its key protagonists, Marcus, points out that already by 
the 1960s questions about scholarly objectivity were being raised.64 In particular, it was during 
the ‘interpretive turn’ and the work of Clifford Geertz during the 1960s and 1970s that claims 
to anthropological ‘truth’ could no longer hold.65 Increasingly, critiques within the discipline 
revolved around exposing the messiness of fieldwork, for example, through ‘confessional 
writing’; contextualising the ‘field’ within colonialism; and experimenting with different types 
of interpretive writing.66 Such an intellectual shift was coterminous with changes occurring in 
a globalising world where the possibility of locating and studying ‘others’ from in a distant and 
distinct field site proved increasingly illusive.67 Experiencing the world as fragmented, 
emergent, and ‘unbearably complex’, anthropologists soon came to understand the nature of 
                                                          
61 Feldman, supra note 52, at 46. For an application of Foucault’s ‘ethic of discomfort’ in her own activist 
ethnography, see L. M. Coleman, ‘Ethnography, Commitment, and Critique: Departing from Activist 
Scholarship’, (2015) 9(3) International Political Sociology 263, at 246 and 278.   
62 T. Ingold, ‘That’s enough about ethnography!’, (2014) 4 HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 383, at 386.  
63 As typified by J. Clifford et al. (eds.), Writing Culture; The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 25th 
Anniversary Edition (2010). 
64 G. E. Marcus, ‘On Ideologies of Reflexivity in Contemporary Efforts to Remake the Human Sciences’, (1994) 
15 Poetics Today 383, at 384-385. 
65 Robben, supra note 50, at 96. See also Marcus, supra note 43.  
66 Marcus (1994), supra note 64, at 385. See also G. E. Marcus & D. Cushman, ‘Ethnographies as Texts’ (1982) 
11 Annual Review of Anthropology 25, at 39.  
67 This is wonderfully captured by Mosse’s account of the problems he faced in trying to exit his field site and 
breaking fieldwork relationships. See D. Mosse, ‘Anti-social anthropology? Objectivity, objection, and the 
ethnography of public policy and professional communities’, (2006) 12 Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 935. This is related to Gupta and Ferguson’s discussion about the ‘hierarchy of purity’, see Gupta and 
Ferguson, supra note 60, at 13. 
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research and its re-presentation through ethnographic writing as a messy and open-ended 
endeavour.68 
While debate now is less intense than at its height during the ‘crisis of representation’, 
disciplinary discomfort prevails and, ‘there is little agreement as to what…constitutes a proper 
site for anthropological research.’69 This is captured in the seminal work of Gupta and Ferguson 
on the nature of the ‘field’ in the late 1990s. For them, ‘“[t]he field of anthropology and “the 
field” of “fieldwork” are…politically and epistemologically intertwined: to think critically 
about one requires a readiness to question the other’.70 Instead, of studying a culture, or an 
organisation in a particular site,71 we can study a situation, 72 a network,73 or a discourse.74 If 
‘field’ as a category collapses, so too does the possibility of objective knowledge. Thus, Gupta 
and Ferguson suggest that: 
[r]ather than viewing anthropologists as possessing unique knowledge and insights that 
they can then share with or put to work for various “ordinary people,” our approach 
insists that anthropological knowledge coexists with other forms of knowledge. We see 
the political task not as “sharing” knowledge with those who lack it, but as forging links 
between different knowledges that are possible from different locations and tracing 
lines of possible alliance and common purpose between them. In this sense, we view a 
                                                          
68 D. A. Westbrook, ‘Creative Engagements Indeed! Open “Disciplines,” The Allure of Others, and Intellectual 
Fertility’, (2014) 3 Journal of Business Anthropology 170, at 176. See also Marcus and Cushman, supra note 66, 
at 45.  
69 Sedgwick, supra note 51, at 65. 
70 See Gupta and Ferguson, supra note 60; and Coleman, supra note 61, at 272.  
71 A rich body of scholarship from the fields of institutional and organizational ethnography have grappled with 
some of these concerns, but are beyond the scope of this article. In particular, see Bruch, supra note 43; A. 
Langhof, ‘Off the record: understanding the (latent) functions of documents in organizations’, (2018) 7 Journal 
of Organizational Ethnography 59; Watson, supra note 43; T. J. Watson, ‘Making organisational ethnography’, 
(2012) 1 Journal of Organizational Ethnography 15; T. B. Zilber, ‘Beyond a single organization: challenges and 
opportunities in doing field level ethnography’, (2014) 3 Journal of Organizational Ethnography 96. 
72 Westbrook points out that, ‘shifting the object of inquiry from traditional cultures to present situations changes 
many things for ethnography, but it does not transform either the fundamental stance of the ethnographer or even 
the activity of learning through conversation – there is no need to understand ethnography as declining along with 
the possibility of geographic discovery’. See D. A. Westbrook, Navigators of the Contemporary: Why 
Ethnography Matters (2008), at 42-3. 
73 Merry, supra note 53, at 141.  
74 For Greenhouse, ‘[c]hanges in the social fields of law in turn affect what constitutes fieldwork. The strong 
emergence of discourse, narrative, performance, and practice as ‘“found objects” … blurs any easy distinction 
between what is “in” some “field” or outside of it’. C. J. Greenhouse, ‘Fieldwork on Law’, (2006) 2 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 187, at 187. Also see Feldman, supra note 52.  
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research area less as a “field” for the collection of data than as a site for strategic 
intervention.75 
 
Ferguson and Gupta’s contribution here is about far more than a persuasive account about the 
disintegration of ‘field’. More significantly, they are suggesting that the researcher is always 
implicated in the re-presentation of a ‘field’.76 
Before I went to CIJA’s headquarters, and like many anthropologists, I felt anxiety 
about not ‘being there’77 – in the ‘field’  - I thought that this could be remedied by ‘grounding’ 
my transnational and disembodied Skype conversations in a place with its particular culture as 
per former classic anthropological studies. Perhaps rather than settle on one site, instead, I 
could adopt a multi-sited approach to allay my empirical anxieties78. Yet as we cannot observe 
all phenomena, we need to question such desires if we see our work as something other than 
empiricism. Thus in moving from the observable to the non-observable, in his study of nonlocal 
ethnography, Feldman suggests that participant-observation can give way to, ‘[p]articipant-
listening[, which] responds not only to the problem of ethnographic access but also to the 
decomposition of ethnographic location’.79 My own research across multiple sites and as 
grounded in none resonates then with Feldman’s move to non-local ethnography, but tries to 
                                                          
75 See Gupta and Ferguson, supra note 60, at 39.  
76 K. Hastrup, ‘Getting it right: Knowledge and evidence in anthropology’, (2004) 4 Anthropological Theory 455. 
77 G. Feldman, ‘If ethnography is more than participant-observation, then relations are more than connections: 
The case for nonlocal ethnography in a world of apparatuses’, (2011) 11 Anthropological Theory 375, at 378. See 
also G. E. Marcus, ‘Ethnography Two Decades after Writing Culture: From the Experimental to the Baroque’ 
(2007) 80 Anthropological Quarterly 1127, at 1132.  
78 For one of the most developed contributions on multi-sited ethnography, see G. E. Marcus, Ethnography though 
Thick and Thin (1998). Merry prefers to call this type of approach ‘de-territorialized ethnography’, which in 
contrast to multi-sited ethnography, ‘comes closer to the notion that this is a disembodied space of social life, one 
that exists in various spaces but is not grounded in any one of them’. See Merry, supra note 53, at 29. It is important 
to note here that Marcus’s ground-breaking work on multi-sited ethnography would not only support continuing 
empirical approaches, but also far more post-structural approaches including within Marcus’s own work. 
79 Feldman, supra note 77, at 377. See also Carroll and Mesman in their consideration about, ‘how long should 
one spend in the field?’. They stress, ‘how compressed time required us as researchers to be reflexive about our 
norms, work with them to find solutions, and then transition to be able to work within the multiple research 
approaches required of us in a contemporary and participatory society’. See Carroll and Mesman, supra note 47, 
at 165.  
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remain ‘ethnographic’ through my own reflections on the dissonance and displacement I 
experienced while encountering such (non)sites.   
As well as questioning the site of anthropological study – the ‘field’- anthropologists 
also began exploring alternative subjects of study. Where once the norm had been for the 
Western researcher to displace herself in a foreign realm redolent of colonial practices,80 by 
the 1970s, there was already a move to bring anthropology ‘home’ and to study those either in 
comparable or higher social positions. Thus, in her seminal piece in 1972 on ‘studying up’, 
Nader argued that increasingly ethnographers would not only concern themselves with the 
marginalised ‘other’, but should turn to studying elites.81 The effects of this move are 
significant in reversing the standard ‘structural dominance’ between the ethnographer and her 
‘informants’ and call for reassessing  the nature of knowledge production and ethics82 in such 
spaces as I discuss in section four. 
Yet this turn to elites does not necessarily only lead to a shift in the subject of study.83 
More significantly, it can also entail a radical questioning about the nature of ethnographic 
knowledge itself as no longer the privileged preserve of the displaced and detached observer. 
Thus in a self-conscious break with ‘studying up’ in their consideration of global elites, Holmes 
and Marcus’ ‘object of study is not the interior lives of experts as an elite as such, but rather to 
understand their frame, which we assimilate by collaboration and complicity, for a project of 
tracking the global, being engaged with its dynamics from their orienting point of view’84. Such 
                                                          
80 Thus, for Sedgwick, anthropology, ‘could not have arisen outside of a colonizing framework’. See Sedgwick, 
supra note 51, at 66. 
81 L. Nader, ‘UP the Anthropologist – Perspectives Gained from Studying Up’, in D. Hymes (ed.), Reinventing 
Anthropology (1972). Merry endorses ‘studying up’ as an important strand within the anthropology of 
international law. See Merry (2006), supra note 53, 108. 
82 Sedgwick, supra note 51, at 60.  
83 H. N. Deeb and G. E. Marcus, ‘In the Green Room: An Experiment in Ethnographic Method at the WTO’, 
(2011) 34 PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 51, at 53.  
84 D. R. Holmes and G. E. Marcus, ‘Cultures of Expertise and the Management of Globalization: Toward the 
Refunctioning of Ethnography’, in A. Ong and S. Collier (eds.), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and 
Ethics as Anthropological Problems (2005), at 248. See also G. E. Marcus, ‘Experimental forms for the 
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an approach is paraethnographic, which is a method or sensibility that emerged at the turn of 
the 21st century out of anthropology’s reappraisal of reflexivity.  
Most simply, we can understand paraethnography as a form of knowledge generation 
that relies on the perspectives of ethnographic subjects themselves, ‘reconceived as theorists 
of a kind’.85 In my case, this meant that I learnt from my CIJA interlocutors presenting their 
reflections on their work to me rather than me generating my own ‘detached’ reflections as per 
participant observation. For Islam, paraethnography, ‘starts from the premise that 
organizational actors can often represent their own cultures to outsiders in ways that are self-
conscious, analytical, and strategic.’86 While paraethnography is often discussed alongside a 
range of other reflexive anthropological methodologies,87 here, I want to stress its singular 
epistemic value in studying professional actors situated in globalised spaces, such as CIJA 
personnel. Marcus and Holmes are perhaps the most prominent scholars to have written on the 
approach and they offer the following description of paraethnography: 
We presume that we are dealing with counterparts rather than “others” – who differ 
from us in many ways but who also share broadly the same world of representation with 
us, and the same curiosity and predicament about constituting the social in our affinities. 
This condition of orienting ethnography in a multi-sited project changes fundamentally 
many of the norms and forms of the established model of fieldwork and ethnographic 
writing.88 
  
Paraethnography then entails intellectual risk as it requires an ‘act of deferral’89 by the 
researcher who now, ‘put[s] the question of what [is] interesting or important in the hands of 
                                                          
expressions of norms in the ethnography of the contemporary’ (2013) 3 HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 
197, at 208. 
85 G. Islam, ‘Practitioners as Theorists: Para-ethnography and the Collaborative Study of Contemporary 
Organizations’, (2015) 18 Organizational Research Methods 231, at 232.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Islam lists these as autoethnograpy; multi-sited ethnography and paraethnography. Ibid.   
88 Holmes and Marcus, supra note 84, at 250-51.  
89 D. Holmes and G. Marcus, ‘Collaboration Today and the Re-Imagination of the Classic Scene of Fieldwork 
Encounter’, (2008) 1 Collaborative Anthropologies 81, at 82.  
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one’s interlocutors.’90 This often instils in the researcher a sense of loss of her orienting 
author(ity) and expertise91 in, ‘an overall process of exchange and dialogue.’92 I too felt 
ungrounded in the midst of my CIJA sojourn, but encountering scholarly debates on 
paraethnography has provided an invaluable lens through which to read my own relationship 
to my fieldwork and to my CIJA informants.  
Interviews can be particularly helpful for informing paraethnography. While 
acknowledging some of the pitfalls of elite interviewing,93 I want to argue that it is nevertheless 
here, through a particular form of discussion between two lawyers, that new understandings 
about law and governance can and do emerge. Within any conversation occurring within a 
given research setting, a variety of shifting power imbalances are at play.94 Perhaps then it is 
better not to speak of ‘studying up’, but rather ‘studying across’ or ‘studying next to’ to capture 
the relative power parity and affinity that we can at least aim for in our conversations with 
fellow lawyers.95 Gusterson suggests that we see interviews as dynamic events, ‘through which 
the identity of the subject…[is] performed and even co-constructed by the interviewer and 
interviewee.’ 96 In conducting my CIJA research, there were times when I had to put my legal 
training to the side as the doctrinal methods I had learnt at Law School did not assist me in 
understanding the nature of CIJA’s work. Holmes and Marcus make a similar point as 
                                                          
90 See Riles, supra note 8, at 260. 
91 Typically, we assume that, ‘“[a]cademic voice has authority. It naturalizes our questions, our concepts, our 
frames of reference and positions us as part of a natural, authoritative “we”’. See Coleman, supra note 61, at 274.  
See also Gusterson, supra note 45, at 117.  
92 Darian-Smith, supra note 58, at 551. 
93 For example, see L. Empson, ‘Elite interviewing in professional organizations’, (2018) 5 Journal of Professions 
and Organization 58. 
94 For example, see Pierce’s reflection on her experience as a female researcher of male litigators in J. L. Pierce, 
‘Lawyers, Lethal Weapons, and Ethnographic Authority: Reflections on Fieldwork for Gender Trials’, in S. D. 
Moch and M. Gates (eds.), The Researcher Experience in Qualitative Research (2013).  
95 For Marcus, this, ‘affinity arises…[the] mutual curiosity and anxiety [of the fieldworker and informant] about 
their relationship to a “third” – not so much the abstract contextualizing world system but the specific sites 
elsewhere that affect their interactions and make them complicit (in relation to the influence of that “third”) in 
creating the bond that makes their fieldwork relationship effective’. See Marcus, supra note 43, at 100.  
96 H. Gusterson, ‘Ethnographic Research’, in A. Klotz and D. Prakash (eds.), Qualitative Methods in International 
Relations (2008), 93, at 105. Also, see K. Perera, ‘The interview as an opportunity for participant reflexivity’, 
(2019) Qualitative Research. 
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anthropologists when they make their case for paraethnography: ‘[w]e must therefore relearn 
our method from our subjects as epistemic partners, from a careful assessment of how they 
engage our world and our time intellectually’.97 Practically, we can (re)present this in our 
writing by providing greater space to our subjects’ voices, especially through long, verbatim 
quotations.98 Yet this, ‘entails risks [of the research] becoming merely parasitic and 
derivative… The navigator [i.e. researcher] brings little to the table and seeks the knowledge 
of the subject’.99 Perhaps it was for this reason that on reading my substantive CIJA work, 
which includes long quotations, law colleagues and peer reviewers told me to remove or at 
least radically cut down such excerpts. As the ‘disembodied’ scholar,100 it was my task to 
analyse general trends from the data and (re)present them in a neutral and detached third person 
voice.  
4. Research as responsibility and the ethics of scholarly expertise  
The ways in which we, as researchers, are positioned as members brings ‘alive’ our 
identities in relation to others – membership is not only about the choices we make about 
our involvement as researchers, but also about privilege, ethics and politics. It is 
importantly, not only choices we make but also how participants see us in relation to them 
and to those around them.101 
 
How we choose to re-present our research is not only a methodological choice, but also an 
ethical one.102 While the general relationship between me as a researcher granted privileged 
                                                          
97 See Holmes and Marcus, supra note 89, at 84. Also see Deeb and Marcus, supra note 83, at 55.  
98 S. P. Bate, ‘Whatever Happened to Organizational Anthropology? A Review of the Field of Organizational 
Ethnography and Anthropological Studies’, (1997) 50 Human Relations 1147, at 166-168; J. Clifford, ‘On 
Ethnographic Authority’, (1983) 1 Representations 118; and J. Van Maanen, ‘Ethnography as Work: Some Rules 
of Engagement’, (2011) 48(1) Journal of Management Studies 218, at 225.  
99 See Westbrook, supra note 72, at 52. Also see D. R. Holmes et al., ‘Intellectual Vocations in the City of Gold’, 
(2006) 29 PoLAR 154.  
100 For Orford, ‘the protocols of scholarly writing in disciplines like law have…. required that the “author” be 
absent from the text. Areas of knowledge such as law, which claim to be objective and technical, require that the 
embodied nature of the human being creating the texts in question be forgotten. An analysis of the ways in which 
lawyers are produced is, therefore, seen as irrelevant to the central debates of the discipline’. A. Orford (1998) 
‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’, Australian Year Book of International Law, 
at 4.  
101 K. MacDonald, ‘Towards a transnational methodology of encounter’, (2019) Qualitative Research. 
102 See Coleman, supra note 61, at 274. 
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access and CIJA as an organisation able to gain some form of scholarly legitimation is mutually 
beneficial, there are a variety of interests and perspectives at stake within CIJA itself, 
particularly given its diverse staffing base located over many sites.103 For example, I noted 
quite different attitudes about the promise of international law for CIJA’s lawyers in Europe 
compared to those working in the Middle East. There was a much greater sense of urgency for 
the Syrian fieldworkers whose professional and personal identities had been transformed 
through their CIJA accountability work. While most had worked as lawyers before the war, 
none had worked in the particular idiom of international criminal justice, highlighting a stark 
difference then with CIJA’s Europe-based lawyers.  
Not only did I benefit from enjoyable conversations over tea in CIJA’s European 
headquarters as well as by Skype with various experts in Australia and the United States, but I 
also spoke to Syrian lawyers risking their lives for their work. My interviews with these lawyers 
felt more risky, not only in implicating me in their continued safety, but also in straying into 
predatory, quasi-touristic inquiry104 that might provide nothing of value to the subjects 
themselves.105 After the immediate concerns about whether I could get ‘enough’ (quality) 
material in this constrained context, more importantly, I needed to ensure that I could share this 
material in an ethical manner.106 As a researcher who has lived in Syria and has lost friends to 
the conflict, this dilemma is particularly raw and it has forced me to reflect on the utility of my 
own discipline of international law and the recurring desire to ‘do something’ as a scholar or 
as a lawyer. 107   
                                                          
103 See A Al-Hardan, supra note 39, at 66.  
104 See Coleman, supra note 61, at 271. Or ‘“suffering” voyeurism’ in Al-Hardan, supra note 39, at 66.   
105 Nouwen notes the problem of the researcher profiting from her subjects and also how she rarely encounters 
these subjects again. See Nouwen, supra note 2, at 244. See also Al-Hardan, supra note 39, at 26. 
106 See Rappert, supra note 48, at 571.  
107 See Orford, supra note 100, at 11. Wood notes that, ‘[i]n carrying out research in conflict zones, the researcher 
inevitably comes to wonder why the research is worth pursuing over purely humanitarian relief work’. See E. J. 
Wood, ‘The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones’, (2006) 29 Qualitative Sociology 373, at 383. 
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While all lawyers must question their positionality as advocates, perhaps this is 
particularly the case for international lawyers cognisant of their field’s complicity with empire 
and its persisting Eurocentrism.108 Does recognising the field’s problematic aspects remedy 
these faults or is something more radical required?109 Similarly, for anthropology, ‘an outcome 
of the discipline’s recent concern over its colonial roots, and fears regarding its possibly on-
going neo-colonial disposition, has been an extension of the missive that anthropologists 
“should do no harm” toward the view that anthropologists’ work “should do some good”’.110 
What type of ‘good’ can international lawyers do in relation to the Syrian catastrophe and does 
this lie within the realm of the academy? While engaging with CIJA’s Syrian staff who are 
often passionately committed to the cause of international criminal accountability, the 
distinction between scholarship and activism often felt rather tenuous. Given the slow pace of 
academic debate as well as international trials at present, the allure of ‘extra-academic’ 
endeavours seems difficult to dislodge.  
Studying dangerous situations as framed through secrecy does not mean that such work 
is qualitatively distinct from other forms of scholarly inquiry.111 It simply provides a starker 
illustration about the potential blurring between scholarship, advocacy, and activism.112 CIJA’s 
                                                          
108 Particularly as sustained by TWAIL scholarship, such as A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making 
of International Law (2005); and A. C. Martineau, ‘Overcoming Eurocentrism? Global History and the Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law’, (2014) 25 EJIL 329.  
109 On the tension between reform and radical change on the question of international law and Eurocentrism, see 
L. Eslava and S. Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law’, 
(2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 103. For a critique of TWAIL’s radical potential, see J. D. Haskell, 
‘TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to International Law’, (2014) 27 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 383.  
110 Sedgwick, supra note 51, at 67-68. See also Nouwen, supra note 2, at 260. 
111 It might require heightened awareness about the potential risk to the research subjects, such as those based in 
authoritarian states. See J. A. Clark and F. Cavatorta, ‘Introduction: The Methodological Challenges of 
Conducting Research in the Middle East and North Africa’, in J. A. Clark and F. Cavatorta (eds.), Political Science 
Research in the Middle East and North Africa: Methodological and Ethical Challenges (2018), at 18. 
112 See Westbrook, supra note 67, at 12; Coleman, supra note 61; and J. Mesman, ‘Disturbing Observations as a 
Basis for Collaborative Research’, (2007) 16 Science as Culture 281.  
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chief legal investigator for Syria articulated this most clearly for me in our 2017 Skype 
conversation: 
[w]hat I want to do now is to speak to your legal conscience, Michelle. Since you are 
conducting this research about this subject, I want to highlight the importance of having 
this research widely published and to reach media outlets. So that other communities, 
our partners in humanity and brothers and sisters in humanity, are aware and are 
supporting this effort [CIJA], and to support, let’s say, this glimmer of hope that has 
started to become a reality in Syria. This is [CIJA], the system of justice and 
accountability, or the system of criminal trials that aims to achieve criminal justice. Just 
the fact that we are pursuing criminal justice generally, that we are holding this slogan 
of criminal justice is huge, and this is a responsibility on us as legal actors and lawyers, 
it is necessary to pursue this [criminal] aspect. I put a responsibility on you now, as a 
colleague, to publish this focus on justice and to affirm it, and as CIJA has undertaken 
an important role in this, so it is necessary to support this work and to provide means 
and resources, whether financial or logistical…so that this work will continue in Syria. 
Because this started as a culture [of criminal justice] and it is becoming a [more robust] 
culture, so it our job is to support and follow this culture.113 
 
Conscious of his own tenuous position, the speaker’s entreaty here is a powerful call to action, 
forcing me to reflect on my responsibility as a privileged researcher,114 a fellow lawyer, and a 
potential activist. While he clearly distinguishes himself from me through his use of the first 
person singular (I/me) compared to the second person singular (you), there is also an implicit 
assumption about our (first person plural) shared understanding of the word, ‘justice’. While 
there is much scholarly debate on the hollowness of this term,115 here my interlocutor suggests 
that as fellow lawyers interested in Syria’s collapse, no further definition is needed. In asking 
me to broadcast my findings about CIJA’s (noble) work then, he calls on me to abandon any 
scholarly pretence of political detachment. Regardless of my own position on how best to 
respond through law to the Syrian case, my limited advocacy capacities as an individual legal 
                                                          
113 Thanks to Anan AbuShanab for her translation.  
114 For Al-Hardan as a privileged Palestinian ‘outsider’ speaking to Palestinian ‘insiders’ in her fieldwork in Syria, 
she notes how the, ‘perceived need to convey the message [about the 1948 Palestinian Nakba, or catastrophe] is 
itself telling of the power relations from where I had come – the imperialist centres of power and upholders of the 
colonial and neo-colonial status quo in the (Arab) world and to where I had come…’. Al-Hardan, supra note 39, 
at 66.  
115 For example, see Clarke, supra note 53.  
Page 28 of 31 
 
academic ensure that I have already failed in this wider task. Constrained as I am by secrecy, 
it is also difficult to know how to put a persuasive case across to a wider audience.  
This entreaty highlights the irresolvable problems we face as scholars in seeking to re-
present our subjects with dignity and with respect while remaining striving for academic 
detachment in our writing – something I am trying to contest here in this article.116 I wanted to 
provide a space for the chief investigator’s ideas without necessarily agreeing with them.117 
Such a move to polyvocality then forces us to grapple with the extent to which we can include 
the voices of our paraethnographic partners while opening up the possibility of critique at the 
same time. For Fassin, the:  
difficulty of developing a critique that is both autonomous and engaged is thus twofold: the 
actors have to recognise themselves in what is said of the way they act, but at the same 
moment, they have to perceive the distance that is being established. To put it more 
forcefully, the critical stance I am advocating necessitates for my interlocutors a dual 
sentiment of recognition and betrayal. Criticism is both loyalty and displacement.118  
 
While I am sure that my interlocutor could recognise CIJA as represented in my own scholarly 
descriptions, my quest for a degree of detachment might also entail a sense of betrayal.  
I wanted to give voice here to CIJA’s chief investigator on Syria to illustrate the delicate 
ethical relationship the researcher enters in undertaking this type of paraethnographic inquiry. 
Yet quotations, ‘are always staged by the quoter, and [for Clifford they] tend to serve merely 
as examples, or confirming testimonies’.119 While inclusion does not mean endorsement or 
agreement, I do ultimately remain as the single author of this text.120 Thus, this type of gesture 
                                                          
116 This is particularly the case for Westerners representing non-Westerners. See A. Robben and C. Nordstrom, 
‘The Anthropology and Ethnography of Violence and Sociopolitical Conflict’, in A. Robben and C. Nordstrom 
(eds.), Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival (1995), at 7-8.   
117 A. Lashaw, ‘How progressive culture resists critique: The impasse of NGO Studies’, (2012) 14 Ethnography 
501.  
118 D. Fassin, ‘Noli Me Tangere: The Moral Untouchability of Humanitarianism’, in P Redfield and E Bornstein 
(eds.), Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics (2010), at 42. See also Mosse, supra 
note 63; and Marcus’s discussion on some of these points in relation to Geertz’s ground-breaking work. in Marcus, 
supra note 43.  
119 Clifford, supra note 98, at 139.  
120 Ibid. 
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of inclusion on my part can only ever be a small paraethnographic step closer to polyvocality 
not only in decentring my own author(ity)121, but in recognising a ‘variety of possible readings’ 
that can arise through the agency of the reader herself.122  
5. Conclusion  
My own reading of CIJA’s international criminal accountability work reveals the particular 
discipline I have been trained to embody, international law, and the extent to which I can step 
beyond these structures by engaging with anthropological debates while continuing to hold 
international lawyers as my primary audience. Although I have started to develop a substantive 
account about the organisation as illustrative of ‘entrepreneurial justice’, in this article I wanted 
to do something different. I wanted to explore how I have also learnt about the possibilities and 
limitations of legal inquiry and knowledge in relation to researching secret spaces. I suggested 
that one particularly fruitful – if risky – approach is through a turn to paraethnography and its 
attendant requirement of the loosening of own scholarly author(ity). Yet this rests on a variety 
of risks. While the nature of CIJA’s entrepreneurial justice work is structured through risk as 
partly offset through secrecy, secrecy itself also begets risk as its legitimacy can be harder to 
sustain. As a scholar interacting with and dependent on my CIJA interlocutors, operating within 
the constraints of secrecy also produces academic risks. Here, I illustrated the constant 
negotiation between risk and integrity that continues to play out for me as the researcher and 
for CIJA as the research ‘site’. In puzzling through the many risks to our research ‘subjects’ 
and to our (disciplined) careers, I have suggested we do so through an ethic of scholarly 
responsibility and humility.123   
                                                          
121 Bate, supra note 98.  
122 Clifford, supra note 98, at 141. See also Marcus, supra note 64, at 391. One noteworthy anecdote here is the 
forceful response I encountered from a colleague after a seminar I gave that had included this very quotation. She 
herself has carried out extensive fieldwork within marginalised communities, but was vehement in her opinion 
that I could not include any material from this interview because of the compromised relationship that she saw as 
occurring between me and my interlocutor.   
123 On scholarly humility, see Nouwen, supra note 2, at 234; and Sedgwick, supra note 51, at 63.  
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Appendix 
Interview questions for Syrian CIJA employees 
1. Please tell me about any university training or specific legal training you have. 
2. Please tell me about your professional background before the war. 
3. When did you start working in the accountability field and why? 
4. How would you describe the nature of consciousness about international criminal 
justice amongst the general public as well as lawyers before the conflict?  
5. How would you say this has changed as a result of the war? For example, is there greater 
interest in international law/human rights in some sectors of society? If so, please 
illustrate. 
6. To what extent was the Syrian war a catalyst for your interest in this work? 
7. Could you please describe how you understand the evolution of the accountability field 
in Syria since the conflict began? In particular, how was expertise in local personnel 
developed? What type of interaction has there been between local, regional and 
international experts? What are the divisions and controversies on the ground in Syria 
about how best to prepare the path for accountability? 
8. How did you come to work at CIJA? 
9. How would you describe the mandate and vision of CIJA in Syria? Would you say that 
your colleagues share this understanding and vision? 
10. Does and if so, how, does CIJA interact with other (expert) individuals and 
organisations in Syria? To what extent do you learn from each other about best practice?  
11. What is your opinion of human rights advocacy organisations working within Syria? 
How do they contribute to eventual accountability? 
12.  To what extent has there been and is there awareness for Syrian experts about regional 
experiences with international criminal justice (such as Palestine, Sudan, Libya, 
Lebanon)? 
13.  In your personal capacity, what do you hope will happen in a post-war settlement? 
What do you think will actually happen? How significant is international criminal law 
in your understanding? 
14.  Are there any cases you draw on in particular for informing your work and/or your 
hopes and expectations about a post-war settlement? 
15.  Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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Interview questions for all other individuals 
1. Please outline in general your legal training: education and experience.  
2. Please outline the nature of your ICL work. 
3. Why did you start work in the ICL field and how would you describe the field then 
compared to now? 
4. Please outline how you came to work on/with CIJA? What was/is your role? 
5. How would you describe CIJA’s mandate? 
6. How do you understand this mandate in relation to accountability in Syria as well as 
accountability efforts in general? 
7. How has your experience within CIJA shaped your understanding of the ICJ field? 
Where do you see the ICJ field heading? What are the key actors and issues for it?  
8. How do you understand the role of HR NGOs and advocacy? How is this related to 
CIJA and your work (or not)? 
9. What are the key challenges in achieving accountability in Syria? What does 
'accountability in Syria' mean to you? 
10. To what extent do you see experts within and outside of CIJA sharing your views? Is 
this important or not? 
 
